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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal timing of migration from an individual
point of view. In addition to the economic differences between the countries, the optimal
migration age also depends on social factors, in particular, the preference for the country of
birth and the migration network established in the host country. The model shows that it
could be optimal to delay the departure time instead of migrating immediately.
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1. Introduction 
A lot of literature has been dedicated to migration from an economic perspective. 
Most of the papers have focused on the effects of immigration on welfare in the host 
country and, recently, in the source country. However, it is individuals and families, not 
nations or governments, who make the decision to move. To our point of view, a study 
of migration should be able to answer two questions: should the individual stay or 
should he go? and if he decides to emigrate, what is the best moment?. In order to 
answer the first question, the benefits and the costs of this decision have to be 
considered. To answer the second question, the influence of the timing of migration on 
the benefits and costs has to be measured. 
Most papers have focused on the first question, because it is usually the difference 
between the salaries of the host and home countries that a potential emigrant considers. 
However, Faini (1996) introduces a parameter that reflects the preference for the 
country of birth, obtaining the migration rate as an endogenous variable that depends on 
both the salary gap and this preference. We also take into account this parameter of 
preference although the purpose of this paper is different from Faini’s work. We also 
assume heterogeneity of the individuals in their preference for the country of origin, but 
we concentrate on the choice of the timing of migration. 
 
There is little theoretical literature about the timing of migration
1. Hartog and 
Winkelmann (2003) study the effect of age, but in an empirical way. To find the 
optimum planned migration age, they compare the estimated marginal benefit of 
increasing the migration age with the marginal cost of later migration. They find that, 
depending on the exchange rate of the currencies, the best decision is to emigrate 
immediately or never to migrate. 
 
We offer a different perspective, considering socioeconomic factors in the 
homeland and in the country of destination, so that the individual compares between the 
utility from emigrating and that of staying at home, instead of comparing only the 
economic benefits. We use a two-stage optimal control technique, which permits us to 
determine the optimal timing of migration theoretically. Using a deterministic 
framework, we introduce the fact that the costs of migration depend on the timing of the 
decision to migrate as a consequence of the preference for living in the country of birth 
and the existence of migration networks.  
From a social point of view, the individual who emigrates suffers the loss of 
relationships in his homeland and  must make a great effort to adapt to the new culture 
(Faini, 1996). Logically, this social cost of migration will be higher the longer the 
individual remains in his country of birth. On the other hand, previous migration 
facilitates future population movements, a phenomenon called network migration. This 
migration provides information about the host region labor market and helps new 
migrants in the settlement process. Darvish-Lecker (1990) shows that the cost of 
migration decreases with a larger migration network. We introduce this evidence into 
our model.  
 
We also take into account the economic conditions. The market is formed by two 
countries, the home country and the host country. As usual, there is an economic 
asymmetry between them in the sense that the home country has a lower level of 
technology than the host country.    2
The model provides the migration age chosen optimally by each individual. 
Contrary to the extended belief that migration should take place at the youngest possible 
age, our framework shows that there may be incentives to wait. For some values of the 
parameters of preference for the country of birth and of the migration networks, the 
range of optimal departure age oscillates between the twenties and the thirties, 
depending on the technological difference. Individuals with less preference for their 
country of origin migrate earlier and those who have deeper home roots prefer to wait 
until the first emigrants establish a better network.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The characteristics of the problem 
faced by the individuals and the main elements of the economy are presented in Section 
2. Section 3 establishes the conditions for the emigrant to leave his home country. If the 
emigrant effectively decides to abandon his country of birth, we characterize the timing. 
Finally, Section 4 closes the paper with a review of the main conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
The model is developed in a context of continuous time. The utility of an 
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where u(.) is increasing and strictly concave and Tj is the life expectancy of individual j. 
The parameter θj indicates individual j's preference for his country of birth, reflecting 
the heterogeneity of the natives in their preference. For simplicity, we assume that it 
takes the value one when the individual emigrates and a greater value when the 
individual lives in his country of origin. In this latter case we assume that the parameter 
has the following form: 
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where t1 is the departure time of the potential emigrant. This expression (2) shows the 
effects derived from a delay in the timing of migration on utility. The parameter φj 
incorporates the fact that there is heterogeneity in the preference for the country of birth 
for each individual worker, in the sense that the greater the parameter, the lower the 
preference for the country of birth
2. Furthermore, for the same individual and, thus, the 
same φj, the longer the individual remains in his country of birth, that is to say t-t1 gets 
lower, the greater is the preference for this country. In other words, the decision to 
migrate implies social and psychological costs derived from the loss of relationships 
and the effort needed to adapt to the new culture. The more people live in a certain 
environment, the greater these types of costs become. On the other hand, we also take 
into account the effect due to the consolidation of migration networks in the host 
country. These networks give important help in arranging transportation and finding 
housing and jobs. The parameter γ shows that the delay in the timing of migration 
makes the consolidation of networks possible. Whatever the choice of the individual as 
to the departure time, there is always a loss in the utility of emigrating, that is to say, 





The production function is AK where A > 0 is the marginal productivity of 
capital and is different between the home and host countries. We denote A1 as the   3
marginal productivity in the home country and A2 as that of the host country. Capital 
accumulation, assuming that the capital depreciation rate is nil, takes the following 
form: 
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  A dot over the variable indicates its variation in time. We also assume that K(0) 
= K0 is given but  0 ) ( ≥ T K  is free. 
  Therefore, the potential emigrant faces two possibilities. He can live in his 
country of origin where the utility obtained from consumption is greater because of the 
preference for the country of birth, but with a lower marginal productivity of capital (A1 
< A2) or he can migrate, paying the social and psychological cost, but having a more 
efficient capital goods sector. Thus, the accumulation of capital is: 
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t C t K A K − =     if    T t t ≤ < 1                                                         (5) 
 
In the following section we establish the conditions that determine the decision 
to emigrate and we characterize the timing. We use the two-stage optimal control 
approach. 
 
3. Optimal departure time 
The optimal control problem is: max  ∫ ∫
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subject to (3) and (4), where K0 is given but  0 ) ( ≥ T K  is free. Note that this objective 
function rewrites function (1). The two-stage optimal control method
4 solves the 
problem as a sequence of two Pontryagin problems: 
1.  The period in which the emigrant has left his country of birth  T t t ≤ < 1 . 
2.  The period in which the potential emigrant stays at home  1 0 t t ≤ ≤ . 
1. In order to solve the first problem, we establish the following optimal control 
problem: 
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Equation (9) allows us to calculate the present value of the welfare during the 
period in which the emigrant remains in the host country, in terms of t1 and  ) ( 1 1 t K K = . 
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2.  In the second step we establish the following optimal control problem: 
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These expressions allow us to answer the two main questions related to 
migration: does the individual decide to emigrate? and, if he decides to emigrate, what 
is the best moment? 
 
3.1 Does the individual decide to emigrate? 
It is clear that the individual decides to emigrate if his welfare during the period 
in which he remains in the host country (in terms of utility) is greater than the   5
corresponding welfare in his home country, in other words, if the benefits from the 
technological gap and the migration networks in the host country compensate the 
individual migration cost. Otherwise, he stays at home. From (10) and (18) it is possible 
to observe that migration provokes a discontinuity in consumption. The consumption 
ratio of the country of birth in terms of that of the host country at time t1  for the 
potential emigrant is given by: 
1 ) ( 1 1
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That means that the consumption in the country of birth is greater than the 
consumption in the host country at the time of migration. Furthermore, in terms of 
utility, the difference is even greater because of the preference for the country of origin. 
This break in the consumption path is due to the fact that migration costs always exist. 
But, this gap is partially controlled by the potential emigrant choosing the departure 
time. Expression (20) shows that the longer the delay, the lower the drop in 
consumption. The reason is that the delay makes the consolidation of networks possible, 
reducing the migration costs. 
  However, to delay departure has another effect on migration costs. The 
postponement of the moment of migration increases the relationships established in the 
country of birth and, therefore, increases the social migration costs for the emigrant. 
This effect is reflected in the consumption growth rate. In the birth country it is A1+φ-ρ 
(see expression 15) whereas in the host country is A2 -ρ (see expression 8). The possible 
growth advantage of migration depends on the technological parameters (A1 and A2) and 
the growth of the social relations (φ) . 
   We have seen that the decision to migrate provokes a fall in consumption only 
at the time of migration. It is clear that if the difference in consumption growth (A2 - A1- 
φ) is negative, there will be no advantage in migrating and the individual will decide to 
stay at home. On the other hand, if there is a growth advantage in the host country, the 
individual will decide to emigrate only if this growth advantage is enough to 
compensate the fall in consumption at the time of migration. Clearly, the optimal timing 
of migration matters, given that this fall depends precisely on the departure time. The 
general intuition is that  migration is best undertaken at the youngest possible age, but 
our analysis indicates that it could be optimum to delay the timing of migration. In the 
following section we find an interior solution for the migration age of the individual. 
 
3.2 When does the emigrant leave his country? 
The incentive that makes it possible that the emigrant prefers to wait is the 
progressive consolidation of migration networks. What discourages the delay is the 
consolidation of relationships in his homeland and the fall in consumption. An interior 
solution could emerge if the process of network consolidation is strong enough to 
compensate the migration costs. Therefore, there is an interior solution  for 0<t1*<T, if 
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The character of the equation makes it impossible to determine the interior 
solution explicitly. Because of this, we resort to simulating the result, which allows us 
to show the existence of the interior solution and, at the same time, that  it is an absolute 
maximum. This simulation could be considered a local proof because of the Implicit 
Function Theorem. Expression (21) defines a 
(1 C  function and if we have a solution, 
then we have a neighbourhood of the points that are solutions to the equation. 
In order to display the solution, we set the following values for the parameters: 
0.03 ρ = ,  003 . 0 = φ ,  0= 1 K ,  0069 . 0 = γ , T = 100,  1 [0,1] A ∈  and  2 [2,3] A ∈ . Graph 1 
shows the solutions that fulfil the necessary condition.  
[Insert Graph 1] 
 
The verification of the sufficient condition is given by Graph 2, where the 
negative points show the solutions to Equation (21) that are maximum. 
[Insert Graph 2] 
 
This graph shows that the optimal age of migration is in the twenties and the 
thirties. This result is in agreement with the empirical data. Table 1 shows the migration 
age in the USA from the year 2000 to 2004.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
We can observe that the timing of migration for the foreign-born population in 
the USA is principally between twenty and forty years old. These cohorts represent 
almost sixty percent of the total immigrants, without including the children that they 
probably bring. 
The elements which determine the optimal timing of migration are A1, A2, γ, φ and 
ρ. The parameters A1 and A2 reflect the economic conditions of the country of birth and 
the host country, respectively. The study of comparative static
5 shows a positive relation 
of t1 with A1 and a negative link between t1 and A2. In our model, migration provides an 
improvement in terms of consumption growth. If the economic conditions of the 
country of birth improve, without changes in the other variables, the advantage in terms 
of consumption growth, A2-A1-φ, will be reduced and, as a consequence, the migrant 
will postpone his decision to migrate in order to mitigate the fall in consumption at the 
moment of migration. On the other hand, an increase in the growth rate of the host 
country implies an increment in the difference in consumption growth rate which 
encourages earlier migration.  
The analysis of parameters γ and φ reveals interesting insights. It shows that 
parameter  γ has an important influence on the timing of migration. Parameter γ 
represents the ease of the settlement process provided by previous migration. A high 
value of γ reflects a faster consolidation of the migration network. Therefore, the 
expected result is that the potential migrant will not need to delay his departure very 
much. This is confirmed in our framework. We know that the model shows a drop in 
consumption at the moment of migration. This drop gets smaller if migration is delayed 
and if there is an increase in parameter γ. The greater the value of parameter γ, the less 
significant the migration costs and, hence, the shorter the delay in migrating. If we 
concentrate on parameter φj, a high value of this parameter corresponds to a low 
preference for the home country. Accordingly, an increase in this parameter will reduce 
the difference in terms of utility derived from the consumption in the host and birth 
countries, which shortens the delay in migrating. This means that individuals with a 
lower predilection for their home country find it optimal to migrate earlier, making it   7
possible to establish and consolidate networks which could encourage other compatriots 
with a greater preference for their country of birth to take the decision to migrate later. 
 
Finally, the comparative static shows a negative link between the intertemporal 
discount of consumption and the migration age. The reason is that a lower value of the 
intertemporal discount parameter ρ is associated to a smooth consumption trajectory. 
That is to say, a reduction in this parameter will imply a greater desire of the individual 
to reduce the fall in consumption at the moment of migration. The way to smooth the 
consumption path is precisely by delaying the moment of migration.  
 
4. Conclusions 
We have built a framework in which it is possible to determine the optimal timing 
of migration. The introduction of both social and economic factors related to migration 
allows us to detect different forces, some of which bring forward the moment of 
migration and others which delay it. The increase of affective relationships when living 
in the home country increases the psychological cost of migration and the best strategy 
is to migrate as soon as possible. An increase in the economic advantage in terms of 
consumption growth in the host country also encourages immediate migration. 
However, delaying the moment of migration could permit the consolidation of networks 
that reduce the cost of migration. The combination of these forces leads to the 
possibility of an interior solution in which the optimal individual decision is to delay the 
departure time until a certain age. 
In this paper we have analyzed the decisions made by individuals at a micro level, 
but they have consequences for macroeconomic performance. To analyze this extension 
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Graph 1. Necessary condition. 


















Graph 2. Sufficient condition. 
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Table 1. Foreign-born population in USA by age between the years 2000 and 2004 
 
(Numbers in thousands) 
YEAR OF ENTRY 
2000 - 2004 
AGE 
Number  Percent 
Total  6.052  100,0 
.0 to 4 years  321  5,3 
.5 to 9 years  410  6,8 
.10 to 14 years  387  6,4 
.15 to 19 years  496  8,2 
.20 to 24 years  1.002  16,6 
.25 to 29 years  1.095  18,1 
.30 to 34 years  828  13,7 
.35 to 39 years  556  9,2 
.40 to 44 years  327  5,4 
A1   9
.45 to 49 years  230  3,8 
.50 to 54 years  135  2,2 
.55 to 59 years  73  1,2 
.60 to 64 years  59  1,0 
.65 to 69 years  51  0,8 
.70 to 74 years  36  0,6 
.75 to 79 years  32  0,5 
.80 to 84 years  6  0,1 






                                                 
1 Dustman and  Kirchkamp (2002) explain, in a context of temporal migration, the optimal migration 
duration in the host country, but our purpose is to determine the optimal departure time. 
2 It can be checked that t-t1 is negative. 
3 To facilitate the notation we drop the individual index in what follows. 
4 The two-stage optimal control technique is described in Tomiyama and Rossana (1989) and 
Boucekkine, Saglam and Vallée (2004). 
5 This study is also carried out using simulations. 
 